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Abstract
To understand cognitive bases of self-reported ruminative tendencies, we examined interpretations and subsequent
memories of ambiguous situations depicting opportunities for rumination. In Experiment 1, we recruited students,
randomly assigned them to a distracting or ruminative concentration task, and then measured their latencies to
complete fragments that resolved situational ambiguity in either a ruminative or a benign direction. Students in the
ruminative task condition who previously self-identified as brooders were quicker to complete ruminative fragments.
In Experiment 2, we simulated this bias to investigate its possible contribution to rumination; nonbrooding students
were trained to make ruminative or benign resolutions of ambiguous situations. Ruminative training led to more
negative continuations of new, potentially ruminative situations in a subsequent transfer task. Next, ruminative training
also caused more negatively valenced errors in recalling the ambiguous transfer situations. Finally, after reflection
about a personal experience, state-rumination scores were higher in the ruminative condition. These results establish
the causal role of interpretation biases in ruminative patterns of thought.
Keywords
rumination, interpretation bias, cognitive-bias modification, brooding
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To some extent, people interpret emotionally ambiguous
situations in benign or negative directions instead of maintaining their inherent ambiguity. The extent to which the
interpretation is negative instead of benign has been associated primarily with measures of anxiety (e.g., Eysenck,
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Hirsch & Mathews,
2000) but occasionally with dysphoria or depression (Hertel
& El-Messidi, 2006; Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002).
More recently, by using procedures called cognitive-bias
modification (CBM), investigators have gone beyond these
bias demonstrations to establish causal connections from
the bias to features of emotional disorders (see the review
by Hertel & Mathews, 2011). In our view, interpretation
bias should be instrumental in the development and maintenance of one feature of depression in particular: the tendency to ruminate or to think repetitively about one’s
problems and oneself in relation to those problems.
Rumination is a maladaptive and prevalent traitlike
feature of depressive disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco,
& Lyubomirsky, 2008). Ruminators tend to perceive their

problems as debilitating and focus on themselves to the
detriment of solution-focused behavior. Recent frameworks for understanding rumination have suggested that
trait rumination is maintained by cognitive biases that
make negative content more accessible and create a
vicious cycle of ruminative thinking and negative affect
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination-related cognitive biases—revealed through correlations—have been
found mostly in attention and memory tasks. For example, ruminators have trouble controlling attention away
from irrelevant self-related or emotional content (e.g.,
Daches, Mor, Winquist, & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2010;
Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). Similarly, depressive rumination has been linked to enhanced retrieval of negative
memories (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema,
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1998) and negative self-related material (Moulds, Kandris,
& Williams, 2007) and to overgeneral autobiographical
memories (Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 2009; Watkins &
Teasdale, 2004).
Two subtypes of rumination have been identified:
reflection and brooding (Treynor, Gonzales, & NolenHoeksema, 2003). Reflection involves purposefully turning inward to engage in problem solving and alleviate
depressive symptoms. Brooding, in contrast, involves
self-critical and evaluative thinking about the self.
Brooding, but not reflection, has been associated with a
variety of negative outcomes, such as increased depression over time (Treynor et al., 2003) and maladaptive
coping strategies (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Cognitive
biases, such as the ones reported earlier, are often specific to brooding (Bernblum & Mor, 2010; De Lissnyder,
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010).
To date, only a few studies have focused on interpretive biases associated with rumination. In a very recent
study (Mor, Hertel, Ngo, Shachar, & Redak, 2014), brooding and nonbrooding students performed a lexical decision task similar to the one first used by Richards and
French (1992) to show interpretation biases in anxiety.
Students judged the lexical status of targets that were
each related to either the ruminative or the benign meaning of the preceding homographic prime. In this type of
lexical decision task, decision times are faster when the
initial interpretation of the homograph is consistent with
the upcoming target (e.g., bitter/angry vs. bitter/lemon).
Accordingly, students who reported a higher degree of
habitual rumination produced faster decision times for
the ruminative targets but not for other targets with negative and threatening meanings. These data were informative but incapable of addressing the possible causal
directions involved.
Causal connections among rumination and cognitive
phenomena were perhaps first explored by experimentally manipulating state rumination and observing the
cognitive and emotional consequences (for a review, see
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). For example, we know
that dysphoric students who underwent a rumination
induction recalled more homographs that they had interpreted personally—bitter, strain, vent—than did participants in other conditions (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006).
Such experiments reveal consequences of rumination but
tell us nothing about why people think in ruminative patterns in the first place. When investigators approached a
similar issue regarding possible cognitive contributions to
anxiety, they developed CBM procedures to simulate or
modify interpretation biases to provide evidence that
interpretation biases influence features of the disorder
(for a review, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011).
We therefore revised the typical CBM procedure used to
modify interpretation bias in anxiety to suit our goal of
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investigating the mechanisms of ruminative habits. Several
investigators have reported modifications of interpretation
biases that are potentially applicable to depression
(Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009;
Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Reports of appraisal
modifications are also relevant (e.g., Miller, Rude, & Haner,
2013; Schartau, Dalgleish, & Dunn, 2009), and one such
study (although not applying CBM) showed direct effects
of “big-picture” appraisal on ruminative thought (Rude,
Mazzetti, Pal, & Stauble, 2011). None that we are aware of,
however, has targeted negative interpretations of ambiguity
as a potential cause of rumination. After developing a set of
ambiguous scenarios with the potential for ruminative resolutions, we conducted two experiments: a first experiment
to document bias in scenario interpretation as a characteristic of individuals who ruminate and a second experiment
to simulate the bias to produce rumination-related consequences. Specifically, in the second experiment, we used
CBM to establish a rumination-related interpretation bias
and then examined the contribution of those effects to subsequent memory bias and state rumination.

Experiment 1
Building on our previous findings (Mor et al., 2014), in
Experiment 1 in the current report, we examined the
rumination-related bias in latencies to complete the fragmented final word of ambiguous scenarios. The final
word disambiguated the meaning of the scenario much
like targets used by Mor et al. (2014) disambiguated the
priming homographs. Scenarios, however, are more ecologically valid materials for expressing the ambiguity
found in real-world settings. Moreover, the scenarios
were modeled after those used by Mathews and
Mackintosh (2000) in one of the first successful CBM simulations of interpretation bias in anxiety. Because we
found their approach useful in considering the design of
our upcoming simulation experiment, we wished to document biases by using the same task in Experiment 1. In
constructing materials related to a ruminative mental set,
we focused primarily on situations conducive to thinking
about oneself in a negative way but that permit other
viewpoints (e.g., “You have a reunion with your high
school friends. Everyone is talking about their lives after
graduation. When you reflect on your own experiences
in relation to everyone else’s, your difficulties seem
[unusual/typical].”). We also tried to capture the backward glance that is so intuitively a feature of ruminative
episodes. In Experiment 1, half of the scenarios ended in
a fragment that established a ruminative meaning for the
scenario, and half ended in a way that established a nonruminative or benign meaning. We predicted that the
alacrity in resolving each type would indicate the ruminative status of the participant.
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In documenting the bias, we reasoned that ruminative
reactions do not dominate every situation that a person
encounters (Takano, Sakamoto, & Tanno, 2013).
Participation in a psychology lab to fulfill class requirements might well sidestep opportunities for rumination.
Three specific features of our design therefore were chosen for the purpose of varying ruminative engagement of
the maladaptive sort. First, we began each session with a
frequently used concentration task to temporarily induce
self- or other-focused thinking (e.g., Hertel & El-Messidi,
2006; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). This selffocused task has been used for a variety of experimental
purposes (e.g., to induce a negative mood in dysphoric
individuals and negative bias in autobiographical remembering; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Again, the purpose of
this manipulation in our experiment was to potentiate a
ruminative state for those individuals who have the habit
of ruminating. Second, we directed participants to imagine themselves in scenarios that were written to potentiate maladaptive resolutions. Engagement through
imagery instructions is a typical feature of bias experiments (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). Third, we recruited participants who scored in the extreme quartiles of the
Brooding subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) because brooding represented the more maladaptive form of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). We predicted that
students with high brooding scores would be quick to
resolve scenarios negatively if they came to the task from
a particularly self-focused perspective.

Method
Participants and design. Undergraduate students
were asked to complete the RRS during their introductory
psychology class. Students whose scores on the Brooding subscale fell into the 1st quartile (8 and below) were
recruited as nonbrooders, whereas those who scored
within the 4th quartile (13 and above) were recruited as
brooders. Brooding scores can range from 5 to 20, and
these cutoffs are similar to those reported in prior
research (e.g., Bernblum & Mor, 2010; Daches et al.,
2010). Forty students in each brooding category initially
were selected and randomly assigned to a combination
of conditions for thought induction (self-focus or distraction) and counterbalancing materials (rotating negative
and benign endings between scenarios), with the constraint of equal cell sizes. Balancing the mean brooding
scores across conditions served as an additional constraint for assignment of the last several participants.
After the data from 4 participants were set aside as outliers (2.5 SD from the overall mean latency for either negative or benign fragments), 4 additional students were
recruited and randomly assigned as replacements. The
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final sample contained 6 females and 4 males in each
combination of brooding category, thought induction,
and condition for counterbalancing materials.1
Materials. The concentration task required two booklets to make the task seem separate from the main computer task. One booklet contained 50 self-focusing
phrases (e.g., “think about: who you are as an individual”) and the other contained 50 distracting phrases (e.g.,
“think about: the typical layout of a classroom”); each
phrase was presented separately on a new page. The
booklets were used by Hertel and El-Messidi (2006) and
were modifications of Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s
(1993) materials, which were designed to induce a state
of rumination in the self-focused condition compared
with the distraction condition.
A total of 40 scenarios were compiled for the main
task. Eight were filler scenarios that described nonambiguous, nonemotional situations, and 8 were ambiguous
scenarios capable of being resolved in a socially anxious
direction (Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000); the latter were included
as a control for a nonspecific negative bias, and the control scenarios were used to make our purpose a little less
obvious. The remaining 24 ambiguous scenarios were
constructed to invite ruminative thinking; each ended in
a word that signified either a ruminative resolution or its
absence. Table 1 contains examples of each type. Each
potential social-anxiety and ruminative scenario was
paired with two possible ending words (negative and
benign), and all words were turned into fragments by
omitting one to three letters, depending on word length,
but never the first letter. Each scenario was also associated with a yes/no question designed to encourage participants to read the scenarios before completing the
fragment. The scenarios were organized into four blocks,
each of which contained 6 ruminative scenarios (3 ending in negative fragments and 3 ending in benign fragments), 2 social-anxiety scenarios (1 ending each way),
and 2 filler scenarios. The scenarios assigned to each
type of ending were fully counterbalanced within each
cell of the design, and the order of presentation within
blocks was randomized anew for each participant.
Procedure. The concentration task in Phase 1 was
described as a pilot study to determine how well people
can concentrate, and participants were told that questions would follow the task. They were instructed to read
the phrase on each page and to concentrate on it by
using their imagination to visualize the idea represented
by the phrase. After 10 s, a beep signaled the participants
to turn to the next page. Afterward, in a task to complete
the cover story, we had participants rate their perceived
ability to form images corresponding to the phrases and

Rumination and Cognitive-Bias Modification
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Table 1. Scenario Examples
Scenario

Benign ending

Negative ending

[Filler/control—Experiments 1 and 2] You
ne-ghb-r [neighbor]
begin reading a book that you recently
found around your house. One afternoon
you are reading it while sitting in the
recliner. The doorbell rings so you put the
book down. You think it could be your . . .
[Socially anxious—Experiment 1] You arrange
unwe-l [unwell]
to meet a friend in town. Last time you met,
you had a quarrel. Just before you leave, she
phones to say that she can’t make it. You
think that this is because she is feeling . . .
[Ruminative—Experiments 1 and 2] While
in-ec-re [insecure]
doing your calculus homework, you
encountered a problem that you couldn’t
solve. The next day, you go to class and turn
it in. Later, you keep thinking about it and
realize that, during class, everyone seemed
so . . .

to concentrate on the ideas during the allotted time periods. Finally, as part of the same cover story, they were
asked to recall five phrases.
The main task in Phase 2 (programmed in Superlab
Pro 4.07, Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA) was
described as unrelated to the Phase 1 task. Details of this
procedure were arranged to be as similar as possible to
those used by other researchers to measure or manipulate
interpretation bias; for example, self-involving imagery
instructions were used (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh,
2000). We asked participants to read each scenario, visualize themselves in the situation, and contemplate their
reaction before pressing the space bar. The bar press
revealed the word fragment, and participants were
instructed to type the completing word in a text box that
appeared below the fragment. We recorded latencies from
the onset of the fragment to the first letter press. By clicking “next,” participants saw the question and typed “yes”
or “no” in the answer box. Two practice examples were
completed in the presence of the experimenter. The Beck
Depression Inventory–II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) was administered after completion of Phase 2. We
used a version that omitted the “suicide” item. We included
this self-report of depressed state to examine whether
there would be reason to suspect that depression would
predict interpretation bias relevant to our scenarios as
well as or better than would rumination measures.

Results and discussion
Mean latencies to respond to the 12 negative and 12
benign scenarios were calculated by omitting error trials

—

Question

Benign answer

Were you watching
a movie when the
doorbell rang?

No

an—y [angry]

Did your friend forgive
you?

Yes

co–fid-nt
[confident]

Did the other students
encounter problems
with the homework?

Yes

(M = 4.2%). Then latencies beyond 2.5 SD of each individual’s mean for the relevant fragment type were
removed. The adjusted mean latencies were submitted to
an analysis of variance with a within-subjects factor for
fragment type (negative and benign) and between-subjects factors for brooding group (low or high) and concentration task (self-focus or distraction). In an attempt to
reduce error variance, an additional factor was included
to represent the counterbalancing condition; significant
effects associated with that factor are not reported.
The only significant effect in the main design was the
three-way interaction of fragment type, brooding group,
and task, F(1, 72) = 4.26, MSE = 148,761, p = .04, ηp2 = .06.
Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 2.
The interaction was partitioned into simple interactions
of fragment type and brooding group within each concentration condition. In the distraction condition, no differences were found (all Fs < 1.0). In the self-focus
condition, the simple interaction was significant, F(1, 36) =
5.07, MSE = 123,142, p = .03, ηp2 = .12. Brooders responded
more quickly to negative fragments than to benign fragments, F(1, 18) = 4.34, MSE = 142,388, p = .052, ηp2 = .19.
The difference in the nonbrooding group was nonsignificant (p > .31). These data therefore reveal an interpretation bias experienced by individuals who report brooding
but only after an induction of self-focus.
The same analysis was performed on the latencies to
complete fragments after the social-anxiety scenarios.
These scenarios have been used to show interpretation
biases related to trait and social anxiety (e.g., Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000). In the current experiment, however,
no systematic differences or effects associated with

Hertel et al.
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Table 2. Results From Experiment 1
Measure
Ruminative Response Scale
Brooding scale
Reflective pondering
Mean RT: Ruminative
Negative fragment
Benign fragment
Mean RT: Social anxiety
Negative fragment
Benign fragment
Beck Depression Inventory–II

Distraction/low
brooding

Distraction/high
brooding

Self-focus/low
brooding

Self-focus/high
brooding

37.6 (8.4)
7.0 (1.0)
9.0 (3.9)

59.7 (10.1)
15.4 (1.6)
12.9 (3.0)

33.8 (6.9)
7.2 (0.9)
7.6 (2.5)

61.8 (9.2)
15.3 (1.7)
13.5 (3.4)

1,708 (669)
1,726 (552)

1,806 (585)
1,674 (406)

1,826 (688)
1,721 (473)

1,586 (395)
1,834 (627)

2,029 (873)
1,857 (626)
8.2 (5.5)

1,916 (752)
2,115 (1,222)
15.2 (9.0)

2,344 (1,320)
2,105 (1,186)
8.8 (5.7)

1,934 (981)
1,893 (1,054)
16.1 (8.8)

Note: n = 20. The table presents means for each measure. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Reaction times (RTs) were measured
in milliseconds. All group differences in questionnaire measures were significant (p < .001), but other effects were not (p > .13). The Beck
Depression Inventory–II did not include the “suicide” item.

brooding and state rumination were found (all ps > .27).
Thus, the interpretive bias revealed by the ruminative
scenarios that we created can be viewed as specifically
ruminative and not generally negative or benign, although
this specificity should be replicated because few socialanxiety trials were included in this design.2
An analysis of variance was conducted on the BDI-II
scores and revealed a significant main effect of brooding
group, F(1, 76) = 18.45, MSE = 55.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .20.
The means reported in Table 2 suggest an effect of selffocus on the scores in the brooding group, but the main
effect of concentration task and the interaction were both
nonsignificant, F < 1.0, as one would expect from a more
stable measure of dysphoria. Finally and more relevant,
we examined the correlation between the BDI-II score
and the valence effect in latencies (benign reaction time
minus negative reaction time) across all 80 participants
and within each condition of the concentration task. All
three correlations were positive, but none was significant
(p > .20).

Experiment 2
Having produced evidence for rumination-related bias in
the interpretation of ambiguity, we turned our efforts
toward its simulation. CBM-interpretation paradigms consist of a training phase in which scores of such scenarios
are resolved consistently in either the benign or the negative direction. Then transfer of training is typically evaluated via a measure of the interpretation of new,
open-ended scenarios. In Experiment 2, we randomly
assigned 20 participants to each of three training conditions (ruminative, benign, and control) and presented 70
training scenarios before asking the participants to write
continuation sentences for 9 new ambiguous scenarios,
to be judged as expressing negative or benign

interpretations. Thus, one measure of the success of bias
simulation is whether participants reveal that bias in similar but unconstrained situations. Writing a continuation
for a scenario is less constrained than is filling in letters
of a predetermined word that functions to resolve
ambiguity.
Ruminative thought feeds on memories for past events.
The review by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) documented
evidence of negative bias in autobiographical memory
among ruminators or those induced to ruminate. Another
possible measure of the success of bias training, therefore, is the extent to which participants reconstruct
aspects of past ambiguous events from a negative perspective. Emotionally ambiguous events can be remembered negatively through reconstructions mediated by
interpretation (Bartlett, 1932). A similar phenomenon
occurs in social anxiety, in which case the memory bias
clearly results from interpretations made on initial exposure to the events to be remembered (Hertel et al., 2008).
This sort of reliance of one type of bias on another type
was first addressed in the combined cognitive-bias
hypothesis of Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006) and
applied to cognition in depression (Everaert, Koster, &
Derakshan, 2012). In fact, evidence of memory bias that
results from CBM interpretation training has already been
found (e.g., Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011). We therefore predicted that a request to recall the transfer scenarios in the current experiment would reveal evidence
for training-congruent biases of the sort that fuel ruminative thought. In practice, we examined the number of
intrusions in the recall of the ambiguous scenarios that
were judged emotionally benign or ruminatively negative. (Our use of the term intrusion refers to the inclusion
of nonpresented material or confabulations during
recall; in this regard, it differs from the term intrusion
used in the context of intrusive memories that arise in
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consciousness in uninvited ways; e.g., Lang, Moulds, &
Holmes, 2009.)
Our final predictions concerned state rumination after
autobiographical recall. In CBM experiments designed to
simulate cognitive contributions to anxiety, investigators
have been careful to argue that CBM is not merely a moodinduction procedure but instead establishes a tendency to
respond anxiously to potentially stressful situations (e.g.,
Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews,
& Rutherford, 2006). Therefore, as a final “far-transfer” task,
we examined ruminative reactions to remembering instead
of anxious reactions to a stressful task. As is often done in
assessments of state rumination (e.g., Grisham, Flower,
Williams, & Moulds, 2011), we asked participants to
describe an unpleasant event from their recent past and
gave them time to ruminate about it afterward before we
administered a measure of state rumination. We predicted
training-congruent effects on that measure. To distinguish
state rumination from mood, we also asked for ratings for
various “states of mind” throughout the session to sample
possible training effects on mood and other states.

Method
Participants and design. As in Experiment 1, we
screened students in undergraduate psychology classes
according to their scores on the Brooding subscale of the
RRS; this time, we recruited students who scored at or
below the median of 10 (to avoid exacerbating rumination and negative mood in brooding individuals). For reasons of convenience, we recruited only female students.
With constraints of equal cell sizes and closely similar cell
means on the Brooding scale, we randomly assigned 20
participants to a combination of training (ruminative,
benign, or control) and a counterbalancing condition for
rotating the valence of scenario resolution across 12 probe
trials. Mean scores on the Brooding subscale were 8.2
(ruminative), 8.3 (benign), and 8.2 (control).
Materials. We developed a set of 70 training scenarios
(and 70 control scenarios), 9 transfer scenarios, and 5
practice scenarios. In addition to the BDI-II, we included
the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick &
Clarke, 1989) and the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus
Inventory (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2013). The
MRSI is a six-item questionnaire that was recently developed to assess state rumination. Participants were asked
to indicate their degree of agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with statements such as “right
now, I wonder why I react the way I do,” “right now, I am
thinking about the possible meaning of the way I feel,”
and “right now, I am conscious of my inner feelings.” The
MRSI has shown good internal reliability and concurrent
validity as well as sensitivity to an experimental
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manipulation of ruminative self-focus (Mor et al., 2013).
In the present sample, the internal consistency reliability
of the MRSI was good (α = .81).
We also used a state-of-mind form (SMF) on which
participants indicated responses by drawing a vertical line
on 100-mm horizontal lines ranging from not at all (0) to
extremely (100) to statements beginning with “I am feeling” and ending with “cheerful,” “in control,” “anxious,”
“relaxed,” “worried,” “sad,” “resentful,” and “content.”
Training scenarios. Each training trial consisted of a
scenario (similar or identical to the ones used in Experiment 1), a word fragment at its end, and a context question. In the ruminative and benign conditions, the same
scenarios were identical and disambiguated by the word
completing the fragment (see Table 1) in either a predominantly ruminative or a benign direction. They described
situations related to academics, personal relations, career
issues, and extracurricular activities. Completion words
were balanced for word length across conditions, as
were corresponding yes/no answers to the context questions. Control scenarios were nonambiguous and nonemotional, and the length of the completing words and
answers to the context questions were balanced with
those measures in the training sets. In both training sets
and the control set, each completion word was unique.
Of the 70 training scenarios, 12 were employed as probes
and presented in all three conditions (including the control condition); 6 of these scenarios ended with negative
completion words and 6 with benign words in a manner fully counterbalanced within conditions. Included
to measure training effects as training occurred, the 12
probes were distributed evenly within the last 42 trials,
and each block of 7 trials contained 1 probe with each
ending. Word length and answers to the context question
were each balanced across the probe categories.
Transfer scenarios. Transfer trials consisted of nine
ambiguous scenarios constructed to potentiate a ruminative or benign interpretation and that ended with a complete sentence (i.e., fragments were not used). Each was
presented with a title above and an answer box below,
into which the participant-generated continuation could
be typed. Three scenarios described academic situations,
three interpersonal, two career, and one extracurricular.
An example scenario follows:
The Presentation [Title]
Some important people visit the office where you
work, and you present a project to them. It is imperative that you do really well. When you are done, your
boss comes to talk to you. Afterwards, you reflect on
the presentation.

Hertel et al.
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Procedure. Before the training phase, participants completed the first SMF and placed it in an envelope to be
sealed at the end of the session and never viewed by the
experimenter. We then told the participants that the first
task required role-playing in a variety of scenarios. They
were instructed to read each scenario, imagine themselves as the main character, and think about how they
would react as that character. Participants were asked to
have a possible completing word in mind before hitting
the space bar to continue to the word fragment and then
to think of the fragment solution before typing the first
missing letter followed by the complete word. The program recorded the latency to type the first letter. Next,
the context question was presented, and the participant
typed “y” for “yes” or “n” for “no” in the answer box
below the question. The program began with 3 practice
trials with the experimenter present to answer questions
and then continued with the 70 training trials.
After a second administration of the SMF, we instructed
participants in the transfer task by asking them to read
each scenario, imagine themselves as the main character,
think about how they would respond, and type at least
one sentence as an ending for the scenario. They completed two practice trials, followed by the nine transfer
trials, and then they responded to a third SMF. Each SMF
was added to the envelope in turn. In the subsequent
memory task, the title and first sentence of each practice
and transfer scenario was presented. Participants were
asked to first recall the remainder of the previously presented scenario and to type it in the box on the screen.
After they clicked “next,” participants were prompted to
recall and type the ending they had previously produced.
This distinction between memory for the scenario and
memory for the ending was practiced with the two practice scenarios from the transfer phase. (The only purpose
in asking for recall of endings was to ensure that participants understood this distinction so that memory intrusions did not merely result from carelessness regarding
the source.)
After the memory task, we asked participants to recall
an event or a situation that took place recently (in the
past 2–4 weeks) that made them feel down, have feelings
of regret, or feel bad about themselves. Then, with the
event in mind, they wrote a description of what happened and what they felt or thought after the event by
typing the text in a Word document. We gave them 4 min
to complete this task, after having promised that the
experimenter would not read the description. At the end
of the allotted time, the experimenter reentered the room
and asked the participant to save and close the document. Then she left to prepare some additional forms and
stayed away for 2 min to provide an opportunity for
rumination about the described event. When she reentered, she administered the MRSI, BDI-II, RRS, and SIAS

separately and in that order. Participants placed each of
these completed forms in the envelope, in turn, and
sealed the envelope. Then participants in the ruminative
training condition were offered a selection of funny videos, and everyone was fully debriefed.

Results and discussion
Transfer of interpretation bias. Endings to the transfer scenarios were categorized as negative or benign
interpretations by two independent raters who were
blind to training conditions; kappas for each of the nine
scenarios averaged to .86, and discrepancies were
resolved by a third rater. Then the number of negative
interpretations (with the number of benign interpretations equaling nine minus this number) was calculated
for each participant and submitted to an analysis of variance with a between-subjects factor for training condition. The analysis revealed a significant effect, F(2, 57) =
8.71, MSE = 2.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. As shown in Figure 1,
the ruminative training condition produced more negative interpretations than did the control condition, t(57) =
2.65, p = .010. Although there were fewer negative interpretations in the benign training condition than in
the control condition, the difference was not significant,
t(57) = 1.47, p = .147.
Memory for scenarios. Recalled transfer scenarios
were categorized according to whether they contained
ideas that had not been part of the presented scenarios
(intrusions) and, separately, according to whether those
intrusions were negative, positive, or still ambiguous with
respect to the rumination dimension. Kappas for each of
the nine scenarios averaged .80 for both measures, and
discrepancies were resolved by a third rater. Then the
number of scenarios with such intrusions and the number of scenarios with negative and positive intrusions
were counted separately, and each total was submitted to
an analysis of variance. Due to experimenter error, data
were missing for 1 participant in the benign condition.
The number of scenarios containing intrusions did not
vary according to training condition (p = .139). This finding suggests that training did not differentially establish
inaccurate recall. Means and standard deviations are
reported in Table 3. The analysis regarding the valence of
intrusions included a factor for training and a factor for
intrusion valence (negative and positive). Both main
effects were significant, as was the interaction showing
that the valence difference significantly depended on
training, F(2, 56) = 3.51, MSE = 1.23, p = .037, ηp2 = .11.
Tests of simple main effects within each training condition revealed that more negative than positive intrusions
were produced only after ruminative training, F(1, 19) =
6.47, MSE = 2.41, p = .020, η2p = .25.
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Fig. 1. Mean number of the nine scenario continuations that were
judged to be negative or benign (the reciprocal of negative) in each
training condition. Error bars depict 1 SE above and below the mean.

State rumination. Scores on the MRSI were obtained
by summing responses to six items that indicated a participant’s current ruminative state. The scores were submitted to an analysis of variance with a factor for training
that resulted in a marginally significant effect, F(2, 56) =
3.13, MSE = 32.66, p = .051, ηp2 = .10.3 As shown in
Table 3, compared with the control condition, scores in
the benign condition did not differ, but participants in the
ruminative condition judged their state as more ruminative, t(56) = 2.04, p = .046.
Other self-report measures. Scores on the BDI-II, RRS,
and SIAS, obtained at the end of the session, did not differ significantly according to training condition (all Fs <
1.0; see Table 3).

Responses to the eight items on the first administration
of the SMF were submitted to a factor analysis by conducting a principal axis factoring with oblique rotation
(oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (.80) verified
the excellent sampling adequacy for the analysis (Field,
2009). Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(28, N = 60) = 122.9,
p < .001, indicated that correlations among items were
sufficiently large for the principal axis factoring. A Markov
chain Monte Carlo simulation for parallel analysis and the
scree plot both indicated that a single factor (accounting
for 40% of the variance) best explained the structure of
the data. Items with factor loadings of less than 0.5 were
not retained. As a result, a composite mood score was
created separately for each administration, averaging the
responses to the following items: “in control,” “relaxed,”
“worried” (reverse-scored), and “content” (Cronbach’s
α range = .72–.77). Higher scores indicated more positive
mood. Composite scores were submitted to an analysis of
variance with training condition as a between-subjects
factor and administration time as a within-subjects factor.
A priori contrasts across levels of administration time corresponded to linear and quadratic trends; the first corresponded to a gradual change across administrations and
the second to a shift after training that returned to baseline. The analysis revealed a marginally significant moodby-time interaction, using a Huynh-Feldt adjustment for
violation of the sphericity assumption, F(3.55, 101.27) =
2.47, MSE = 121.90, p = .056, ηp2 = .08. Only the quadratic
interaction was significant, F(2, 57) = 5.17, MSE = 92.40,
p = .009, ηp2 = .15. Follow-up tests of simple comparisons
showed that the quadratic function was significant only
in the ruminative condition, F(1, 19) = 5.60, MSE = 156.81,
p = .029, ηp2 = .23. The means reported in Table 3 show
that these participants’ moods were less positive after

Table 3. Memory Intrusions and Self-Report Results From Experiment 2
Training condition
Measure
Number of memory intrusions (out of 9)
Positive
Negative
Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory
Ruminative Response Scale (final)
Brooding scale
Reflective pondering
Beck Depression Inventory–II
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale
State-of-mind form (factor score)
Before training
After training
After transfer

Benign
1.79
0.74
0.74
17.6
46.8
10.6
10.0
9.8
28.0

(1.32)
(0.73)
(0.73)
(5.5)
(10.8)
(4.0)
(3.1)
(5.6)
(11.9)

60.5 (18.5)
65.2 (17.2)
63.9 (16.3)

Control
2.20
0.75
1.00
18.0
46.2
9.8
10.2
11.0
28.0

(1.11)
(0.85)
(0.86)
(4.9)
(12.5)
(3.3)
(3.1)
(6.5)
(9.2)

56.0 (14.9)
59.4 (12.5)
60.1 (13.3)

Ruminative
2.75
0.45
1.70
21.8
47.4
11.0
11.4
12.0
30.7

(1.92)
(0.61)
(2.00)
(6.6)
(13.8)
(2.9)
(4.6)
(7.7)
(15.0)

62.5 (17.6)
54.1 (14.8)
62.0 (14.6)

Note: The table presents means for each measure. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Number of participants in each condition is 20
in all cells except for memory measures (n = 19 for benign) and the Momentary Ruminative Self-Focus Inventory (n = 19 for ruminative). State-ofmind form ratings were measured on a 100-point scale. The Beck Depression Inventory–II excludes the “suicide” item.
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training, but the mood returned to baseline before the
memory test. Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude
that memory intrusions were mood congruent or that
mood mediated the effects on the state-rumination
measure.4
Training latencies. Mean latencies in milliseconds to
respond to probe scenarios during training were analyzed
after we set aside data from 5 participants whose means
on either negative or benign trials were greater than 2.5
SD from the overall mean. Latencies were measured from
the presentation of the fragment to the keystroke for the
first missing letter. Latencies to solve benign fragments
were longer than were those for negative fragments (mean
benign = 2,863 ms; mean negative = 2,071 ms), F(1, 54) =
5.86, MSE = 1,086,189, p = .019, ηp2 = .10. This main effect
probably indicates a bias in our materials toward ruminative endings because even the control condition showed
a mean difference of 335 ms. The difference was large
enough to make it difficult to detect an interaction with
training conditions, even though the difference in the
ruminative condition was more than twice the difference
in the other two conditions (mean ruminative = 730 ms;
mean benign = 355 ms). Moreover, these means were
likely unstable, given their basis on only six trials. Another
possible reason for the failure to find a significant interaction with this measure, unlike a similar measure in Experiment 1, is that the latency to type the missing letter was
used instead of the latency to type the complete word.
This method seemed to have increased the average time
to respond and the associated variance.

General Discussion
These experiments were designed to document and simulate rumination-related biases in the interpretation of
ambiguous events. Experiment 1 revealed that students
with high scores on the brooding component of rumination completed word fragments to disambiguate ambiguous scenarios in a negative direction faster than fragments
that resolved the ambiguity in a benign direction, but
they did so only if they had previously engaged in a selffocused mental set. Experiment 2 successfully simulated
the interpretation bias found in Experiment 1, as judged
by the endings to open-ended scenarios produced by
nonbrooding participants who had been randomly
assigned to the ruminative condition. Moreover, performance on other tasks in Experiment 2 suggested that the
induced negative bias produced consequences for state
rumination. One consequence was negative intrusions in
memory for the ambiguous beginnings of the transfer
scenarios. Of equal importance, after recalling unpleasant events in their recent personal past, the newly trained
“ruminators” reported higher levels of state rumination.
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The evidence for a rumination-related interpretation
bias in Experiment 1 is consistent with results from a few
previous efforts to discover interpretation biases of the
depressive kind. For example, Wenzlaff and Bates’s
(1998) scrambled-sentence task is similar to an interpretation task, given that participants make sentences with
or without negative connotations; in their experiment
and subsequent similar ones, they found that dysphoric
students more often unscrambled the words to form negative sentences. These findings and others that have
shown depression-related memory biases can be considered depressive habits of thought (Hertel, 2004). The
most characteristic cognitive habit in depression, however, is rumination, and the results of Experiment 1 suggest that a component of rumination is indeed the
tendency to interpret ambiguity in a negatively biased
direction. Experiment 1 results replicated previous demonstrations of a ruminative-related interpretation bias
(Mor et al., 2014), this time with materials more ecologically valid than individual homographs and, it is important to note, with the type of stimuli frequently used to
modify interpretation biases of other kinds.
Experimental control over an aspect of a naturally
occurring habit permits statements about cause and
effect.5 The transfer results in Experiment 2 indicate that
multiple experiences in interpreting ruminatively can
establish the habit to do so under unconstrained conditions for interpreting ambiguity. Evidence for the development of such a cognitive habit was provided in a
near-transfer task in which the participants completed
ambiguous scenarios by writing continuation sentences
that were training congruent. The request to write a sentence to continue a paragraph (not merely a word to end
a sentence, as in training) is arguably less subject to
demand characteristics than are other transfer tasks that
present benign and negative alternatives. Participants in
the ruminative training condition wrote more negative
continuations than did those in the other two conditions.
Moreover, a far-transfer task of thinking about a recent
personal experience revealed training effects on a subsequent measure of state rumination.
Of course, neither set of effects can be claimed to have
changed the way the participants think in the long term—
thankfully. And although we also cannot claim that the
effects were short-lived, we believe they were, given that
even longer sessions of training anxiety-related interpretation biases have not been shown to last longer than a
day or so, unless training sessions are repeated (Hertel &
Mathews, 2011; MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). The
important aspect of these transfer effects, for our purpose, is their proof of principle. We assume that learning
to see the dark side through experiences in the real world
is durable in part because the “training trials” are distributed across time and context.
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Another essential feature of real-world training to
ruminate surely is the memorial “side effect” of interpretation bias: once interpreted, thus remembered. Our
memory results are therefore important to the case for
rumination training. Like the biased continuations of
transfer scenarios, the memory bias occurred only with
respect to ruminative training, although the lack of effect
of benign training might be due to the low level of memory errors in general (i.e., floor effects in comparison
with the control condition). Our participants were
remarkably accurate in remembering the transfer scenarios and in distinguishing them from their own continuations, no doubt due to the low number of scenarios
employed as well as to the immediacy of the recall test.
Nevertheless, almost two of the nine scenarios were
remembered with a ruminative slant by participants in
the rumination training condition. This proportion is
comparable with other demonstrations of interpretationbased memory intrusions (e.g., Hertel et al., 2008; Tran
et al., 2011).
In addition, we believe that even a few reconstructive
errors are meaningful, given their reliance on interpretation biases during initial encounters and the reliance of
those biases on individually meaningful situations.
Specific scenarios cannot seem personally relevant to
everyone. Bartlett’s (1932) view of reconstructive errors
reflected similar reasoning. Moreover, in the context of
clinical treatment, memory errors need not be numerous
to serve as meaningful bases for ruminative episodes and
as relevant bases for modification by therapeutic challenges. What is lacking in this analysis, however, is a
clear demonstration of interpretation-based memory bias
by people who self-report high degrees of rumination.
Such a demonstration should be a high priority for future
research, given the strong anecdotal evidence for memorial confabulations in ruminative thinking.
We turn now to a consideration of the lack of evidence of effects from benign training, compared with the
control condition, because it indicates a possible limitation in the use of our paradigm. One possible and admittedly post hoc explanation is related to the fact that the
scenarios all potentiate ruminative responses. Benign
training might involve an initial ruminative interpretation
that is counteracted when the final word leads to a
benign resolution. This counteraction—first negative,
then benign—possibly occurred in a way that resulted in
benign participants’ performance on all measures being
similar to that of control participants’ who saw only a few
such scenarios. In short, the benign training might have
exerted strong effects that could not be observed because
our control condition did not control for this possibility.
A control condition in which participants were allowed
to find their own completions for all training scenarios
might reveal a natural tendency to appear ruminative
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when placed in the hypothetical situations we invented.
We believe that this condition must be included in future
experiments, but in the meantime, it is important to consider that any tendency to first interpret in a ruminative
direction before counteraction would probably produce
negative memory intrusions in the benign condition, and
this outcome did not occur. Still, we recommend further
research concerning the absence of a difference between
the control and benign conditions. If it is truly a null
effect, perhaps it can be attributed to the nature of the
sample, selected in this case on the basis of preexperimental tendencies not to brood when sad.
Despite its nonclinical samples, the present research is
clinically relevant in two main ways. First, and more
directly, our findings may help in understanding temporal fluctuations in rumination. They suggest that for people who do not ruminate habitually (e.g., our participants),
ruminative episodes of the sort made possible during our
far-transfer task of pondering a recent personal event are
more likely to arise after negative or self-involving interpretations of ambiguous events. Measures taken to monitor and discourage self-focused interpretations of
ambiguity might thereby function prophylactically to aid
resilience (e.g., Hertel & McDaniel, 2010).
Second, our evidence for causal contributions of interpretation bias to aspects of rumination encourages work
in the other direction: bright-side training for those individuals who habitually ruminate and are vulnerable to
depression (e.g., Holmes et al., 2009). One obvious reason to continue investigations of benign-interpretation
training is its possible application in decreasing stable
ruminative tendencies as well as state rumination. By
adding to current efforts to identify fundamental cognitive causes of rumination (e.g., Daches & Mor, 2013), our
findings can perhaps assist in designing interventions to
reduce this maladaptive habit. It is important that although
there are documented efforts to apply CBM procedures
as a treatment for anxiety (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012a,
2012b), development of CBM protocols for rumination
and depression lags behind (cf. Blackwell & Holmes,
2010). A major goal in designing new treatments for
depression should therefore involve extended explorations of ways to decrease ruminative habits. Ruminative
habits do not develop overnight and, therefore, will likely
not be remediated by CBM sessions that are simply conceived. Successful application of CBM will likely require
training across various types of ambiguity and contexts to
prevent relapse (Bouton, 2000), and training must be
spaced (Bjork & Bjork, 2011).
In addition to manipulating interpretations of ambiguity, training must incorporate other processing methods
(e.g., Miller et al., 2013; Watkins et al., 2009). The training of cognitive control, of the sort encouraged by mindfulness training (e.g., Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995),

Hertel et al.

724
might ultimately be necessary to establish controlled
opposition to old habits as new habits are developed
(see Hertel, Holmes, & Benbow, 2013). In the meantime,
however, we emphasize the importance of the present
bias demonstration and simulation. Resolving ambiguity
with a self-focused and reflective slant clearly not only is
associated with but also contributes to ruminative
thinking.

felt sadder and less content after ruminative training, but the
effects had dissipated by the beginning of the memory task, as
indicated by significant quadratic but not linear trends.
5. A reviewer of this manuscript was concerned that we are
suggesting levels of cause corresponding to necessity and sufficiency of interpretation bias in the development of a ruminative
style. Our manipulation, like most, is capable of establishing
evidence for contributory cause, nothing more.
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Notes
1. Students who enroll in introductory psychology classes
are representative of the population of Trinity University students, who are mainly middle class and identify as Black/
African American (4%), Asian (7%), Latina/Latino (17%), White/
Caucasian (58%), or Other (14%). Less than 1% of students are
older than 22 years (but our pool consisted mainly of 18- to
19-year-olds).
2. We note the apparent trend in the social-anxiety data for a
negative bias exhibited by brooders in the distraction condition. Without a priori prediction and significant overall effects,
however, specific comparisons are not justified.
3. One participant in the ruminative condition chose a rating
of 1 (not at all) for all six items and was the only participant
to score less than 10. After discovering that the participant’s
written description was quite negative and that her RRS score
was relatively high, we set aside her MRSI score because we
believed that it was not genuine.
4. When the scales were each separately submitted to analyses of
variance, only two scales obtained significant interactions: contentment, F(3.43, 97.84) = 3.16, MSE = 32.66, p = .023, ηp2 = .10
(Huynh-Feldt adjustment due to violation of sphericity), and sadness, F(4, 114) = 3.55, MSE = 176.49, p = .009, ηp2 = .11. Participants
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